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What the West's assimilation accusations against China reveal about its own historical burdens_我的网站

一 |     杭州市公安局关于公开征集涉黑涉恶违法犯罪线索的公告为深入贯彻落实党中央关于深化扫黑除恶专项斗争的决策部署，依法严厉打击黑恶势力犯罪，切实维护人民群众生命财产安全和社会长治久安，现向社会公开征集涉黑涉恶违法犯罪线索。    (ECNS)-- China's newly implemented Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law has elicited a predictable response from certain Western media outlets. Whenever ethnic unity is referenced, some Western critics rush to frame it as "assimilation" or a push for uniform national identity.    Fan Yichou, associate professor at the Law School of Minzu University of China, argues that such misinterpretations arise primarily from projecting Western historical nation-state building trajectories onto China's ethnic policies.    Put simply, some Western observers do not view China from the perspective of its domestic social realities, but rather judge it through the lens of their own historical experience.    Fan argued that the traditional Western nation-state model rests on a core premise: one ethnic community ought to align with one sovereign state, with political boundaries largely overlapping ethnic territories. To build culturally homogeneous nation-states, most Western powers historically sought to eradicate internal ethnic diversity through assimilation, exclusion, and other coercive measures. Such nation-building drives were often accompanied by territorial conquest, mass population displacement, and systemic violence.    He drew on arguments laid out by Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka, who observes that the classical European template of nation-building rested on an implicit consensus: states should strive to become culturally homogeneous, by either assimilating national minorities or expelling them. For centuries, this ideal of a mono-national state shaped state policy across almost all Western European countries, with Switzerland stands out as the only major exception.    This deep-rooted historical trajectory continues to frame contemporary discourse on ethnic governance.    A stark modern illustration emerged in 2025, when Danish local authorities took away the newly-born daughter of an 18-year-old Inuit mother from Greenland just one hour after birth following a controversial parenting competency assessment. Her case was far from isolated. According to reports by the BBC and other media outlets, another Greenlandic mother had all three of her children under state custody. She was first subjected to a so-called parenting competency test after social services raised concerns about the language development of her eldest daughter. Although the Danish government has decided to stop using such tests on Greenlandic families, local authorities have yet to halt the practice.    The enduring harm of assimilationist policies extends far beyond this Danish case. UNESCO’s Memory of the World archives document that Canada's Indigenous residential school system continuously operated for nearly 150 years, with the explicit state objective of assimilating Indigenous children into settler society. Generations of Indigenous children were forcibly separated from their families, severed from their ancestral languages, cultural traditions, and intergenerational knowledge systems.        The United States has grappled with comparable challenges. According to a 2025 Associated Press report, Native American children in California are roughly about four times more likely to enter the foster-care system than their peers.    Newborns separated from their mother shortly after birth. Generations of children torn apart from their families and ancestral languages. Indigenous youth who remain vastly overrepresented in foster-care placements to this day. All these are legacies of the West's long-standing obsession with assimilation.    That explains why, when some in the West hear China speak of "ethnic unity," they instinctively equate it with "assimilation." In reality, they are projecting their own social trauma onto China.    China's context, however, is fundamentally different.    As Fan Yichou notes, China has long been a unified multi-ethnic country. Within the Chinese tradition, political unity has not demanded cultural uniformity. Instead, unity and diversity have coexisted across most of the nation's history.    This outlook finds theoretical expression in the concept of plurality-in-unity put forward by renowned Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong. In his framework, China's 56 ethnic groups represent the plurality, whereas the Chinese nation embodies unity.    From this perspective, the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law is not designed to eliminate ethnic differences. Instead, it seeks to strengthen a shared sense of belonging while respecting cultural diversity.    This distinction highlights a broader divergence between China and the West in approaching identity and social cohesion.    In many Western societies, historical assimilation sought to diminish group differences and compel minority groups to conform to dominant-culture norms. By contrast, China's emphasis on forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation is not intended to obliterate diversity. It seeks to build shared civic and national identity, while enabling all ethnic groups to sustain their own languages, customs, and cultural traditions.        Ethnic groups may speak different languages, practice different customs, and vary in development level. Yet they can still uphold shared dedication to national progress and a common sense of belonging within a unified multi-ethnic state.    Genuine ethnic unity does not require everyone to fit into the same mold. It means ensuring that different ethnic groups can participate in national development while maintaining their own cultural characteristics and thriving with equal dignity and equitable opportunities.    So when some in the West equate China's "ethnic unity" with "assimilation," their judgment stems not from an accurate assessment of China’s reality, but from a subconscious projection of their own historical burdens, contemporary social anxieties, and deep-rooted institutional scars onto China's ethnic policies.    They are either unwilling or unable to fully comprehend China's governance philosophy and practices, yet arbitrarily pass arrogant judgment on the country. The outcome of this biased approach will be no exception of absurd narratives that fundamentally contradict objective reality.                    。请广大群众踊跃举报，协助公安机关依法打击各类涉黑恶违法犯罪活动。一、举报范围（一）新型涉黑涉恶违法犯罪线索。征集利用网络平台和“软暴力”手段有组织实施的新型涉黑涉恶违法犯罪线索。

二 | 1.“软暴力”催收类：为追索债务，对欠款人及其关系人进行电话滋扰、短信轰炸、曝光隐私、PS图片、跟踪贴靠、辱骂恐吓或在有关场所纠缠哄闹、聚众造势、散播污名等，有组织实施寻衅滋事、敲诈勒索、侵犯公民个人信息的违法犯罪线索。2.恶意索赔类：为牟取非法利益，虚构、编造损害事实或以商家存在经营瑕疵为由，假借消费维权、侵权索赔等名义，通过投诉、举报、诉讼、曝光、差评和滥用行政救济权利等方式对被害人施压以索要赔偿的违法犯罪线索。3.舆情敲诈类：以非法占有为目的，收集、捏造、夸大涉及环境保护、医疗卫生、教育招生、工程建设等行业领域主体的负面或不实信息，利用自媒体、网站、短视频等途径，通过持续曝光、批量转发、扩大影响等手段要挟，以“删帖费”“公关费”“合作费”“宣传费”等名义迫使被害人给付财物的违法犯罪线索。4.务工敲诈类：以非法占有为目的，利用网络招工平台物色目标，应聘成功后故意制造劳务纠纷、矛盾事端，向用工主体索要“误工费”“交通费”“餐饮费”等，被拒后通过滋扰闹事、言语威胁、堵门阻工、扬言跳楼等“软暴力”手段或申请劳动仲裁，以向有关部门投诉举报等方式逼迫用工主体给付钱财的违法犯罪线索。

三 | 5.碰瓷敲诈类：在道路交通、餐饮消费、医疗美容等领域有预谋制造事故或虚构人身、财产被侵害假象，采取纠缠滋扰、聚众造势、曝光隐私等“软暴力”手段胁迫被害人给予赔偿的违法犯罪线索。

四 | 6.强迫消费类：以非法占有为目的，在餐饮住宿、医疗美容、家政装修、旅游购物等常见民生领域，通过虚构低价、夸大效果等方式诱骗被害人消费，通过中断服务、限制离店、暴力胁迫等方式强迫被害人购买高价劣质产品服务的违法犯罪线索。

五 | 7.色情敲诈类：在娱乐服务场所，有组织地利用色情服务为诱饵，设局实施敲诈勒索、抢劫，或通过获取的涉密关系信息进行要挟并实施敲诈勒索的违法犯罪线索。8.“裸聊”敲诈类：通过网络聊天工具引诱被害人进行“裸聊”，录制视频或以木马程序窃取通讯录信息，以发送不雅视频给亲友为由，以损坏他人人格、名誉，揭露他人隐私相威胁，实施敲诈勒索的违法犯罪线索。

六 | 9.网络“套路贷”类：依托网络平台，以“低息、无抵押、快速放款”为诱饵，诱使或迫使被害人签订“虚高借款合同”，通过恶意制造违约、垒高债务，并伴随软暴力催收等手段，非法占有他人财物的违法犯罪线索。10.网络暴力类：通过网络非法获取、曝光公民个人信息，以诬告陷害、恐吓威胁、侮辱诽谤、电话短信轰炸、线下滋扰等“软暴力”手段，有组织地实施“人肉搜索”“开盒挂人”“有偿代骂”“水军滋事”“刷量控评”“挑动对立”“恶意攻击”等违法犯罪线索。（二）涉“六霸”黑恶违法犯罪线索。征集“村霸”“乡霸”“沙霸”“矿霸”“街霸”“市霸”等“六霸”类黑恶违法犯罪线索。

七 | 1.“村霸”类：利用家族、宗族势力，通过暴力或“软暴力”手段，横行霸道、欺压百姓、操纵破坏基层选举、把持基层政权、垄断农村资源、侵吞集体资产的违法犯罪线索。2.‌“乡霸”类：横行乡里、欺压百姓、煽动闹事、干扰执法、操控地方事务、垄断乡镇工程项目、控制乡镇公共资源的违法犯罪线索。3.‌“沙霸”类：在沙石资源领域，以暴力、“软暴力”等手段要挟，实施强占资源、非法采沙、控制运输、围标串标、垄断沙石市场、破坏合法经营秩序的违法犯罪线索。

八 | 4.‌“矿霸”类：在自然资源领域破坏生态环境、矿产资源管理和合法经营秩序，实施非法采矿、强占矿山资源、控制矿产采运销环节的违法犯罪线索。5.‌“街霸”类：在城市街道、商业区、夜市等公共场所，采取暴力或“软暴力”手段，实施寻衅滋事、强迫交易、敲诈勒索、打架斗殴、强拿硬要、操控“黄赌毒”、强收保护费、插手民间纠纷、充当“地下执法队”的违法犯罪线索。6.‌“市霸”类：盘踞在农贸集市、批发市场、商业街市、旅游景区等各类场所，通过暴力、“软暴力”手段，实施欺行霸市、强买强卖、非法打压竞争对手、操控行业经营、垄断市场、破坏正常经营秩序的违法犯罪线索。（三）征集其他涉黑恶违法犯罪线索。1.涉未成年人类：采用胁迫、教唆、引诱、欺骗等手段，有组织地操控未成年人实施违法犯罪，严重侵害未成年人权益的违法犯罪线索。2.涉黑恶关联犯罪：实施制贩毒品、开设赌场、组织卖淫等黄赌毒黑合流及境内外黑恶势力非法勾连的违法犯罪线索。

九 | 3.涉黑恶逃犯逃匿信息：涉黑恶逃犯的活动轨迹、藏匿地点、资金往来、通联方式、境外潜逃情况等相关线索。

十 | 二、举报方式（一）杭州市公安局扫黑办举报电话：0571-87282717举报信箱地址：杭州市上城区望江街道婺江路169号，杭州市公安局扫黑办（邮编310000）（二）杭州市公安局上城区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-87283368举报信箱地址：杭州市上城区四季青街道景芳路63号，杭州市公安局上城区分局扫黑办（邮编310020）（三）杭州市公安局拱墅区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-88823110举报信箱地址：杭州市拱墅区麒麟街11号，杭州市公安局拱墅区分局扫黑办（邮编310003）（四）杭州市公安局西湖区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-87289038举报信箱地址：杭州市西湖区西溪路666号，杭州市公安局西湖区分局扫黑办（邮编310023）（五）杭州市公安局滨江区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-89522110举报信箱地址：杭州市滨江区江汉东路55号，杭州市公安局滨江区分局扫黑办（邮编310051）（六）杭州市公安局萧山区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-82770001举报信箱地址：杭州市萧山区晨晖路1399号，杭州市公安局萧山区分局扫黑办（邮编311200）（七）杭州市公安局余杭区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-88728110举报信箱：杭州市余杭区五常街道书径弄18号，杭州市公安局余杭区分局扫黑办（邮编311121）（八）杭州市公安局临平区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-86222110举报信箱地址：杭州市临平区南苑街道藕花洲大街爱民路10号，杭州市公安局临平区分局扫黑办（邮编311100）（九）杭州市公安局钱塘区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-87283077举报信箱地址：杭州市钱塘区义蓬街道杏花村6组50号，杭州市公安局钱塘区分局扫黑办（邮编310018）（十）杭州市公安局富阳区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-63323486举报信箱地址：杭州市富阳区鹿山街道依江路756号，杭州市公安局富阳区分局扫黑办（邮编311407）（十一）杭州市公安局临安区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-63751110举报信箱地址：杭州市临安区锦北街道马溪路667号，杭州市公安局临安区分局扫黑办（邮编311300）（十二）桐庐县公安局扫黑办举报电话：0571-64630676举报信箱地址：桐庐县城南街道白云源西路28号，桐庐县公安局扫黑办（邮编311500）（十三）淳安县公安局扫黑办举报电话：0571-64819890举报信箱地址：淳安县千岛湖镇排岭北路30号，淳安县公安局扫黑办（邮编311700）（十四）建德市公安局扫黑办举报电话：0571-64710123举报信箱地址：建德市新安江街道法院路2号，建德市公安局扫黑办（邮编311600）（十五）杭州市公安局西湖风景名胜区分局扫黑办举报电话：0571-87285500举报信箱地址：杭州市上城区老复兴街23号白塔17幢，杭州市公安局西湖风景名胜区分局扫黑办 （邮编310008）三、举报须知（一）举报内容应尽可能提供涉案人员姓名、户籍地、经常居住地、联系方式及犯罪发生时间、地点、作案方式，有资金往来、合同凭证、音视频资料、聊天记录等相关证据的一并附上。（二）严禁捏造、歪曲事实，诬告陷害他人，严禁借举报实施打击报复，构成违法犯罪的，依法追究法律责任。鼓励实名举报，公安机关将对举报人信息严格保密，依法保护举报人及相关人员安全；对举报查证属实的，依照相关规定予以奖励。（三）主动投案自首、如实供述、积极退赃、检举揭发并查证属实的，依法可以从轻、减轻处罚。杭州市公安局2026年8月14日资料/市公安局。

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